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President George W. Bush once bemoaned: "They want the federal government controlling
Social Security like it's some kind of federal program." I find great inspiration in these words.
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. Introduction
An employee who is otherwise required to pay Social Security taxes under
the Federal Insurance Contributions Act of 1954 (FICA)' may be exempt if the
employee's compensation is received as remuneration for "service[s] performed
in the employ of... a school, college, or university... [and] if such service is
performed by a student who is enrolled in and regularly attending classes at
such school, college, or university.,2 The federal courts have been inconsistent
in determining whether medical residents' stipends fall under these "student"
exemptions.3 These conflicting rulings have been the result of differing
analytical approaches,4 creating not only unequal treatment under the Internal
Revenue Code, but also an unfair burden on taxpayers as they attempt to
anticipate how a particular federal court will rule on this issue. Since 1998,
there have been over 7,000 claims seeking refunds of FICA tax contributions;
the total amount claimed in these refund suits well exceeds $1 billion. While
1. See Federal Insurance Contributions Act of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3128 (2000)
(imposing additional taxes on employees and employers for purposes of contributing to the
Social Security and welfare systems).
2. Id. § 3121(b)(10).
3. Compare Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying factual
inquiry into nature of relationship of medical residents with university and affirming district
court's ruling that medical residents met requirements for student exclusion), andUnited States
v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Mayo 1), 282 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1019-20 (D. Minn.
2003) (finding student exclusion applicable to medical residents at all of Mayo's various
institutions, and ordering refund by United States of monies paid pursuant to FICA tax), with
United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 05-71722,2006 WL 3497312, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 1,
2006) (finding statute and applicable regulations ambiguous, requiring review of statutory and
legislative history), and Albany Med. Ctr. v. United States, No. 1:04-CV-1399, 2007 WL
119415, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2007) ("[A]s a matter of law, medical residents continue to be
subject to FICA taxes today because they do not qualify for the student exemption of...
§ 3121(b)(10).").
4. Compare Apfel, 151 F.3d at 748 (adopting a case-by-case analysis for determining the
nature of residents' employment relationships with their university), andMayo Found. for Med.
Educ. & Research v. United States (Mayo II), 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (D. Minn. 2007)
(finding "student exclusion" provision of § 3121 "not complicated or filled with technical
language, but ... straightforward"), with Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *8 (finding
the language of "student exclusion" provision ambiguous and requiring judicial review of
statutory and legislative history to determine legislative intent).
5. United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1229
(S.D. Fla. 2005).
1370
THE IMPOSSIBLE STUDENT EXCEPTION
medical residents may not be affected significantly by this issue as individuals,6
hospitals and other similar organizations remain vulnerable as they must
"match" all employee FICA contributions.7 Ambiguity in this area of tax law
constitutes a difficult obstacle for taxpayers in the medical community.
This Note will address the unique characteristics of, and current tensions
between, tax law, the Social Security system, and the various processes
employed by the federal courts, all of which have led to such ambiguities. Part
I will introduce the two divergent approaches employed by the federal courts
in deciding whether medical residents qualify for the student exemption,
identifying those analytical tools which should be salvaged, and those which
were either improperly employed or are simply irrelevant to the dispute in
question. Part III will review briefly the history of the current Social Security
system and related statutes and regulations, focusing on the development of the
student exception under § 3121 (b)(1 0).8 In this context, Part IV will discuss
how tax law presents several practical problems and internal inconsistencies
6. An initial question arises as to whether medical residents seeking exemption from
FICA taxation under § 3121(b)(10) would nevertheless be liable for self-employment taxes
under 26 U.S.C. § 1401. See 26 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000) (imposing a tax on the self-employment
income of every individual for purposes nearly identical to those associated with FICA taxes).
If not, qualifying residents would be exempt in toto from any sort of tax contribution to the
Social Security and welfare systems; if so, the institutions sponsoring the residents would not be
required to withhold taxes from their residents' stipends (and thus would not be required to
match those employee contributions as employers), but the residents themselves would be
required to contribute at double the rate of taxation. Compare id. §§ 1401(a)-(b) (stating that
beginning December 31, 1989, the rate of taxation under § 1401 for self-employment income
became 11.4%, plus an additional 2.9% for hospital insurance), with id. §§ 3 101(a)-(b) (stating
that employees are taxed at a rate of 6.2%, plus an additional 1.45% for hospital insurance), and
id. §§ 311 l(a)-(b) (stating that employers are taxed at a rate of 6.2%, plus an additional 1.45%
for hospital insurance). It seems, however, that qualification under § 3121(b)(10) would not
expose medical residents to self-employment tax liability. In this case, the applicability of
§ 1401 turns on a close reading of § 1402(c), specifically in relation to the term "trade or
business" and whether it contemplates taxpayers who qualify under § 3121(b)(10). See id.
§ 1402(c) ("The term 'trade or business' ... when used with reference to self-employment
income or net earnings from self-employment ... shall not include.., the performance of
service by an individual as an employee, other than [certain limited exceptions of § 3121(b)]."
(emphasis added)). Section 1402(c)'s enumeration of the § 3121 (b) exclusions which are not to
be excluded from the definition of "trade or business" must be read as an exhaustive list, and
§ 3121 (b)(10) does not appear on that list. Therefore, income gained by medical residents in the
employ of their sponsoring institution does not derive from the residents' "trade or business,"
and medical residents falling under § 312 l(b)(10) will not be viewed as "self-employed" for
purposes of § 1401 taxation.
7. See 26 U.S.C. § 3111 (2000) ("[T]here is hereby imposed on every employer an excise
tax, with respect to having individuals in his employ, equal to the following percentages of the
wages.., paid by him with respect to employment.") (emphasis added).
8. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (b)(1 0) (2000) (stating the student exception to FICA taxation).
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which render resolution of disputed tax issues more difficult than in many other
areas of law.
Part V of the Note will argue that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
should view graduate medical education programs (GMEs) in the United States
as institutions of higher education, and view their medical residents as students
because, as a practical matter, the relationship between medical residents and
their sponsoring institutions is one based on the pursuit of medical education.
Part VI will propose a framework to resolve these tax issues, balancing law,
policy, and economics to reconcile the principle considerations of tax
scholarship. Specifically, this Part will argue that the IRS's attempts to
disqualify residents from the student exception contravene Congressional intent
and that the federal courts' further reliance on a "case-by-case" standard of
review is unnecessary. Accordingly, GME programs and their medical
residents should be afforded the presumption of qualification under the student
exception of § 3121 (b)(10).
1. Approaches Employed by the Federal Courts
The heart of this dispute turns on the appropriate interpretation of the
student exclusion. That is, whether the statute can be read as ambiguous, thus
requiring a review of statutory history.9 Two prominent federal cases represent
the current dichotomy in this area of the law: Minnesota v. Apfel 1° and United
States v. Detroit Medical Center." A discussion of these and related cases
follows.
A. The Majority Approach: Minnesota v. Apfel
In 1955, the State of Minnesota entered into a "section 218" agreement
2
with the federal government to extend Social Security coverage to a select
9. See United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 05-71722, 2006 WL 3497312, at *11
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 1,2006) (arguing that because the "student exclusion" provision is ambiguous,
"[e]xtrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a
reliable light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms"
(quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005))).
10. See Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742, 747-48 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding the student
exclusion provision of Minnesota's Section 218 agreement with the federal government
applicable to the University of Minnesota's medical residents).
11. See Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *8 (finding that medical residents were,
as a matter of law, not "students" for purposes of FICA's student exemption provision).
12. In its early stages, the Social Security Act was inapplicable to state government
1372
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group of its state government employees. 13 This agreement was modified in
1958 to extend coverage to "'[s]ervices performed by individuals as employees'
of the University of Minnesota."' 4 Additionally, the modification provided an
exclusion for "[a]ny service performed by a student."' 15 Perhaps the most
important aspect of the court's analysis is its adoption of a case-by-case analysis
for determining the applicability of the student exemption to residents at the
University of Minnesota: "The Commissioner cannot avoid... a case-by-case
examination by summarily concluding that medical residents are never students
regardless of the nature of their employer."16 This case-by-case approach has
become the main vehicle through which GME programs and their medical
residents have succeeded in challenging FICA liability over the past several
decades.
17
1. Background and Holding
Understanding the student exemption to include those stipends received by
medical residents from their university, the State of Minnesota did not withhold
Social Security contributions for nearly forty years,' 8 a practice that was finally
challenged in 1990 when the Social Security Administration assessed a
deficiency for unpaid contributions relating to resident stipends. 19 After an
unsuccessful administrative review of this assessment, Minnesota appealed to
the district court for a redetermination. 20 The court granted summaryjudgment
in favor of Minnesota on two alternative holdings: First, that under the 1958
modification, residents were not classifiable as "employees" under the Section
employees; however, Section 218 of the Social Security Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 418)
enabled states to contract with the federal government through a formal agreement, thereby
affording such employees coverage, with the option of withdrawing from the program. See
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REv. 885,940 (2000)
(discussing Section 218 in the context of a challenge to the repeal of employees' "withdrawal
rights" as an unconstitutional taking of property).
13. Apfel, 151 F.3d at 744.
14. Id.
15. See id (noting this modification's compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 418(c)(5) (2000)).
16. Id. at 748.
17. See infra note 107 and accompanying text (identifying federal courts which have
employed the Apfel approach).
18. Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742, 744 (8th Cir. 1998).
19. See id (noting the Social Security Administration's assessment of roughly $8 million
in unpaid Social Security contributions).
20. See id. ("Both the State and the Commissioner [of the Social Security Administration]
filed motions for summary judgment.").
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218 agreement for purposes of contribution to Social Security; and second, that
even if residents could be classified as employees, the student exclusion
incorporated in the 1958 modification applied to the medical residents. 2' The
Administration appealed.22
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed both of the district
court's alternative holdings.23 The court's analysis of the residents' "employee"
status focused on the nature of the Section 218 agreement between Minnesota
and the Administration, specifically whether such an agreement constituted a
contract or "merely written evidence that [Minnesota had] exercised its
statutory option to participate in the Social Security program."24  The
Administration relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen v. Public
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment,25 arguing that, as a result of
Bowen's holding, Section 218 agreements did not create a Fifth Amendment
property interest in the right to withdraw from the program, and that the Section
218 agreement with Minnesota, thus, did not constitute a contract.26 The
appeals court rejected this argument, pointing out Bowen's numerous
references to "contractual agreements" and its obvious assumption that Section
218 agreements were indeed contracts. 27 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's finding that the parties did not intend to include medical residents in the
1958 coverage extension modification.28
The Eighth Circuit also agreed with the district court's alternative holding
that, even if medical residents were properly considered "employees," the
residents' stipends were nevertheless exempt under the student exclusion
incorporated in the 1958 modification.29 The court focused on the nature of the
21. Id. at 744-45.
22. Id. at 745.
23. Id. at 745-49.
24. Id. at 746.
25. See Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 54-56
(1986) (holding that Congress's reservation of the right to alter terms of Section 218 agreements
with contracting states was constitutional).
26. See Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The [Bowen] Court
concluded that because Congress had expressly reserved the power to amend section [2] 18, it
also retained concurrent power to affect the terms of agreements entered into pursuant to that
section."). The Social Security program was designed to last for an indefinite period of time,
and given the difficulties in accurately predicting future economic conditions, Congress
contemplated a flexible system. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960).
27. Apfel, 151 F.3d at 746.
28. Id. at 745 n.7 (discussing evidence upon which the district court relied when
determining the intent of the contracting parties).
29. See id. at 747 (finding residents' "primary purpose" for enrolling in the university was
educational, not for purposes of employment).
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relationship between the university and its medical residents.3 ° Arguing that
the Eighth Circuit's holding in Rockswoldv. United States31 required a finding
that stipends received by medical residents were in the nature of compensation
for services rendered,32 the Administration contended that the residents'
"primary purpose" was to earn income rather than receive an education.33 The
court rejected this argument, stating "[t]he fact that payments received by the
residents constitute taxable income does not mean the primary purpose of their
relationship with the University is not educational. 3 4  Highlighting that
residents paid tuition and were enrolled in classes, the Eighth Circuit found no
dispute that the residents' primary purpose was to obtain an education, and,
therefore, application of the student exclusion was proper.
35
2. Analysis of the Student Exception: How Does Apfel Play Out Today?
While a majority of federal courts have employed the Apfel
approach,36 the opinion ultimately focused on contract interpretation and a
review of the student exception as it existed within the four corners of the
Section 218 agreement between Minnesota and the federal government.
37
30. Id. at 747.
31. See Rockswold v. United States, 620 F.2d 166, 169 (8th Cir. 1980) (affirming the
district court's determination that stipends properly are included in medical residents' gross
income for income taxation purposes).
32. Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 1998).
33. Id. In Rockswold, the issue was whether, for federal income tax purposes, medical
residents should be permitted to exclude stipends from their gross income on the theory that
stipends constituted non-taxable scholarships or grants. Rockswold, 620 F.2d at 167-68. The
Rockswold court focused on the nature of the payments to the residents, as opposed to the
relationship between the school and the resident. See id. at 169 ("The fact that the services
provided required only a portion of the medical fellows' time is not controlling. The threshold
question is whether the payment was made as quid pro quo for the services rendered." (citing
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969))).
34. See Apfel, 151 F.3d at 747 ("[W]e noted [in Rockswold] that the University's
residency program 'is designed to educate and train physicians so that they can pursue careers in
academic medicine and medical research."' (quoting Rockswold, 620 F.2d at 167)).
35. Id. at 748. The court also rejected the Administration's argument that a Social
Security Ruling-which declared that medical residents were not students-should control the
court's interpretation of the term "student." Id. The court found that ruling inconsistent with
applicable regulations calling for a case-by-case analysis of the relationship between the student
and the educational institution. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1028(c)).
36. See infra note 107 and accompanying text (noting one court's reference to a majority
of federal courts using the Apfel approach in determining applicability of student exception to
medical residents).
37. As noted above, the court made numerous references to the contractual nature of the
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The court noted, however, that the language of 42 U.S.C. § 418(c)(5) (the
codification of the student exception found in Section 218 agreements)
made reference to the general student exclusion in the Social Security Act,
as amended through 1984. 38 The similarities between the language of the
Section 218 agreement and the current student exception under
§ 3121(b)(10) 39 have enabled courts in recent decisions to rely upon
Apfel's examination of student exemptions in the Internal Revenue Code.
4 0
The Apfel opinion remains good law; however, the court's "student
exception" analysis is thin, likely due in part to the court's initial holding
that the parties intended to exclude medical residents from Social Security
coverage via contract.4 1 The substance of the case-by-case approach has
developed primarily through subsequent federal court decisions handling
this issue, most thoroughly in Judge Richard H. Kyle's 42 2003 opinion in
Section 218 agreement, and the Commissioner's primary contention was that because the
agreement was not contractual in nature, the parties' intent at the time when the agreement was
entered into was irrelevant. Id. at 745. It is Apfel's alternative holding which has motivated
various other GME programs to file refund suits claiming repayment of previously withheld
FICA taxes in relation to their medical residents.
38. Id. at 747; see also 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(10) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (providing
language identical to the current student exception under 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10) (2004)).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 05-71722,2006 WL 3497312, at *7
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 2006) (appreciating strong similarities between language of the Section 218
agreement and § 3121(10)(b), and between 20 C.F.R. § 404.1028(c) and Treas. Reg.
§ 3121.3121(b)(10)-2(b) & (c)).
40. See, e.g., Univ. of Chi. Hosps. v. United States, 545 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the student exception under § 3121(b)(10) unambiguously did "not categorically
exclude medical residents from eligibility"); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (D. Minn. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-3242 (8th Cir.
Sept. 8, 2007) (rejecting Government's attempts to draw bright-line rule disqualifying medical
residents for the student exception as in conflict with Apfel's case-by-case approach); Ctr. for
Family Med. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1117 (D.S.D. 2006) ("The court finds...
that the law in the Eighth Circuit prohibits such a bright line rule." (citing Minnesota v. Apfel,
151 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 1998))); United States v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research,
282 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1010 (D. Minn. 2003) (affirming the case-by-case analysis established in
Apfel).
41. The Apfel court notes that while related administrative rulings may be entitled to
deference, they are not binding and "courts will not defer to rulings that are 'plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the Act or regulations."' Apfel, 151 F.3d at 748 (quoting Chavez v. Dept.
of Health & Human Servs., 103 F.3d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1996)). On several occasions, the
Government has unsuccessfully challenged the "student exception" holding in Apfel as non-
binding dictum by the Eighth Circuit. See Ctr. for Family Med. v. United States, 456 F. Supp.
2d 1115, 1119 (D.S.D. 2006) (holding that a binding, alternative holding is not dictum) (citing
Brazzell v. United States, 788 F.2d 1352, 1357 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Detroit
Med. Ctr., No. 05-71722, 2006 WL 3497312, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 2006) (same).
42. The Honorable Richard H. Kyle sits in senior status as a Judge for the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota. Judge Kyle has authored two of the more
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United States v. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research
(Mayo ).43
3. Mayo I
The facts in Mayo I are essentially identical to those in Apfel, with the
exception that the Mayo Foundation is a private organization and is, therefore,
required to withhold taxes under FICA.44 The principal focus of Judge Kyle's
analysis was the language of § 3121(b)(10) itself, specifically if, as the
Government argued, the provision was ambiguous as to whether Mayo's
residents might be covered by a plain reading of the statute.45 Without his own
independent review of the statute, Judge Kyle found this argument
unpersuasive. 46 After a brief review of the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Apfel,
47
the court immediately turned to § 3121(b)(10)'s implementing regulations to
determine the student exception's applicability to the Mayo residents.48
prominent opinions pertaining to the issue discussed in this Note. See generally Mayo Found.
for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States (Mayo II), 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Minn. 2007);
United States v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Mayo 1), 282 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D.
Minn. 2003).
43. See Mayo 1, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 (holding student exception applicable to Mayo
Foundation's medical residents).
44. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting the prior mechanism for extending
Social Security coverage to state employees).
45. See Mayo I, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 ("[T]his case presents the narrow question of
whether an express exemption set forth in FICA applies to the individuals who served as
residents at Mayo."). "The question.., is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly begin
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose." Id. (quoting Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)). Note the important distinction: Judge Kyle chose not
to address the question of whether § 3121(b)(10) is, on its face, ambiguous, but instead turned
directly-and perhaps prematurely-to the statute's applicable regulations.
46. See id. (finding simply that the Government had failed to provide any significant
support that § 3121(b)(10) possessed anything other than what a plain reading of the statute
yielded).
47. Id. at 1009-10.
48. See id. at 1010-11 (adopting the two part test prescribed by 26 C.F.R.
§ 31.3121(b)(10) for exception qualification). The court stated:
Defendants must.. . show that "the character of the organization in the employ of
which the services [were] performed [was] a school, college, or university..."
and.., that the residents were "enrolled and regularly attending classes at the
school, college, or university by which [they were] employed or with which [their]
employer is affiliated."
Id. at 1010 (quoting Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(b)(10)-l(b)(1)-(2) (2003)).
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Finding that the Mayo Foundation was the common-law employer of the
medical residents49 and that Mayo's several institutions properly were
considered a "school, college, or university" for purposes of the exception, °
Judge Kyle turned to the question of whether the Mayo residents qualified as
"students" as contemplated by the statute.51 The court relied on several distinct
characteristics of the Mayo Foundation to find that, in the context of its
relationship with the residents, the GME programs were educational in nature. 2
Specifically, the court noted that admission to the program was entirely merit-
based53 and that residents were required to participate in daily teaching rounds
in addition to classroom attendance.5 4 Former residents also testified at trial
that when they had matriculated into Mayo, they had no expectation of
employment subsequent to completion of their degree program," the stipends
were not a significant incentive for their interest in the program,56 and that their
purpose for enrollment was to obtain specialized skill and knowledge in their
medical field of study.5 7 The Government also challenged Mayo's exemption
status on the basis that the patient care provided by these residents was not "for
the purpose of and incidental to pursuing a course of study.5 8 The court
rejected this argument, noting that "[t]ime alone cannot be the sole measure of
the relationship between services performed and a course of study."59
49. See id. at 1011-13 (discussing the Mayo Foundation's influence over the medical
residents and finding that the foundation was the residents' employer).
50. See id. at 1013-15 (rejecting Government's "primary purpose" test for determining
whether an institution qualified under the exemption and finding the "Mayo Foundation, a
nonprofit, charitable, tax-exempt institution, constitute[s] a 'school, college, or university' for
purposes of § 3121(b)(10)").
51. Id. at 1015.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1017 (noting that while the residents were not registered for credit hours, the
well-defined subject areas covered by the GME program with evaluations based on grades to be
recorded on official transcripts was sufficient to characterize the residents as "regularly
attending classes").
55. Id. at 1008 n.8.
56. See id. at 10 17 (noting former residents' testimony that "their purpose in enrolling in a
residency program ... was educational-to gain the knowledge and skill necessary to practice
in a specialty area of medicine" and that they "were not attracted to... residency programs
because of the stipend") (citations omitted).
57. Id.
58. See id. ("[TIhe United States contends [that] Mayo residents were working in
hospitals and clinics between fifty and eighty hours per week, an activity that dominated any
'course of study' being pursued.").
59. Id. at 1018. "The learning process on clinical rotations consisted largely of residents
1378
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Accordingly, the court held that Mayo's medical residents (and their stipends)
qualified for the student exception of § 3121 (b)(10).
60
Judge Kyle's discussion of Mayo's established curriculum, 61 mandatory
attendance at educational lectures and conferences,62 and the administration of
written, graded examinations 63 illustrates the general nature of GME programs
in the United States.64 In addition, and perhaps most important to the analysis,
Judge Kyle noted Mayo's "learning by doing" method of instructing its
residents via teaching rounds and patient care.65 Applying the regulation's two-
part test to these characteristics of the Mayo GME programs, 66 the court
addressed the following two issues: the applicability of § 3121 (b)(10) to Mayo
residents 67 and whether the residents were "students" as contemplated by the
exception.
68
making suggestions to the staff physicians and the staff physicians correcting the residents." Id.
(emphasis added).
60. Id. at 1019-20.
61. Id. at 1002.
62. Id. at 1004.
63. See id. ("Transcripts for residents... bear letter grades for each completed rotation in
a given subject area.") (citations omitted).
64. See infra Part V (discussing in detail the characteristics of American GME programs).
65. United States v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Mayo 1), 282 F. Supp. 2d
997, 1003 (D. Minn. 2003).
66. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (referencing the court's acknowledgment of
treasury regulation § 31.312 1(b)(10)'s two-part test). As an initial matter, Judge Kyle addressed
the Government's familiar argument that the student exception was, as a matter of law,
unavailable to the medical residents. Mayo I, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1005-06. In support of this
argument, the Government relied upon the repeal of the medical intern exception as evidence
that Congress intended "to bring all young doctors-in-training within the scope of Social
Security coverage and, hence, FICA taxation." Id. at 1006. This argument was first
addressed-and rejected-by the District Court for the District of Minnesota in Minnesota v.
Chater. Minnesota v. Chater, No. 4-96-756, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7506, at *9-10 (D. Minn.
May 21, 1997), affdsub nom. Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 1998). As the court
had ruled previously, Judge Kyle found this argument unpersuasive. Apfel, 151 F.3d at 1007.
But see United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
(believing that, when it repealed the intern exception, "[i]f Congress had intended to include
residents and interns within the student exception, Congress would likely have stated that it was
overruling St. Luke's.") (citations omitted).
67. See Mayo I, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-15 (identifying the residents' actual "employer"
and reviewing that employer's status as a "school, college, or university").
68. See id. at 1015-18 (reviewing "enrollment," "regular class attendance," "residents'
purpose" for involvement in GME program, and the nature of their services as factors in
determining status as "students").
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a. Applicability of the Student Exception to Mayo Residents
The court first addressed the issue of whether the organization qualified as a
"school, college or university" (SCU)69 under treasury regulation § 3121 (b)(1 0)-
2(d), which stated: "The term 'school, college, or university' within the meaning of
this section is to be taken in its commonly or generally accepted sense."7 °
Responding to Mayo's request that the court look to dictionary definitions in
interpreting "SCU,"71 the Government pointed to other provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code and their implementing regulations using language roughly similar to
that found in § 3121 (b)(10), arguing that because those sections required the
application of a "primary purpose" test, so should the student exception under
§ 3121(b)(10).72 The court was not persuaded, positing that had the IRS intended
for these phrases to be interpreted identically (or at least similarly), the Service could
have referenced such provisions in the regulations relating to the student
exception.73
One of the Government's strongest arguments was evidence of Mayo's
operating expenditures: Over three-quarters of the Foundation's overall expenses
related to patient care, while roughly five percent related to education and clinical
support.74 Therefore, according to the Government, Mayo's GME programs could
not reasonably be characterized as having an "educational" purpose. Again, Judge
69. Id. at 1013-15. Of course, if the court had found that the Mayo Foundation was
outside the definition of this term, any further inquiry into the matter would have been
meaningless.
70. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) (2003).
71. United States v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Mayo1), 282 F. Supp. 2d
997, 1013 (D. Minn. 2003).
72. See id. ("The United States challenges the Defendants' recourse to dictionary
definitions, arguing that the proper test for evaluating whether an organization is a 'school,
college, or university' is the identification, through objective evidence, of the organization's
'primary purpose."'). Compare 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10) (2000) (relating to "school, college, or
university"), with id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (relating to charitable contributions and gifts using
language of "educational institution"), and id. § 151 (c)(4)(A) (relating to deductions for
personal exemptions using language of "educational organization").
73. Mayo 1,282 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. It is worth noting the court's failure to address this
issue from the perspective of Congress. That Congress used different language in § 3121(b)(10)
could be interpreted as evidence of Congress's intent to draw a meaningful distinction. That is,
§ 151 and § 170 of title 26 deal with deductions from individual, taxable income, whereas
§§ 3101-3128 pertain to FICA taxation. Federal income tax statutes represent Congress's
exercise of taxation and spending powers; FICA tax statutes are merely the means by which the
Social Security Administration funds its OASDI and welfare programs-the two are entirely
separate and distinct. Arguably, Congress intended the FICA student exception to have broader
applicability than the education-related deductions found within the Tax Code's revenue
provisions.
74. Mayo 1, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 & n.32.
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Kyle rejected the Government's position, noting that "the Foundation could
provide patient care far more cost-effectively without residents because of the
time and effort required to supervise them. The Foundation's financial
statements establish that [for the years at issue] the Foundation had negative
net revenue from patient care."7 5 And loss of revenue from patient care
makes sense in the context of GME programs at teaching hospitals. The
study of specialized medicine requires something other than traditional,
parochial approaches to education. Simply put, classroom lectures and
textbook assignments, while undoubtedly important aspects of a resident's
professional and scholastic development, alone would likely prove
ineffective. It is therefore unsurprising that GME programs place significant
emphasis on kinesthetic learning, often to the detriment of the umbrella or
parent organization's profitability.76 "Because the objective of residency
programs is ultimately to make physicians capable of caring for patients
twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, it is impossible to separate
'education' from 'patient care.', 77 Assuming such an objective to be the
overarching goal of American GME programs, it is impossible not to
recognize interconnectivity between these programs' education and patient
care "departments." Compartmentalizing expenses and drawing departmental
lines is unnatural in the context of GME programs and only serves to avoid a
realistic analysis of their true nature and function. As Judge Kyle pointed out
in Mayo I, the proverbial classroom "must be the clinical setting because
patient care in a medical specialty is what residents are receiving training
for."78 Accordingly, the court found that Mayo qualified as an SCU.79 Judge
Kyle then turned his attention to the Mayo residents.
75. Id. at 1014. Profitability alone, however, is not a reliable standard by which to
determine an organization's purpose. The net operating loss associated with Mayo's patient
care is one of several indicia showing that the Foundation is concerned with issues other than
turning a profit. The court's logic is that the "other issue" here must be the provision of quality
education.
76. See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (reviewing accreditation standards
imposed on GME programs which tend to limit maximum work hours).
77. United States v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Mayo 1), 282 F. Supp. 2d
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b. Were the Residents "Students"?
Concerning whether the residents qualified as "students," the regulation
stated that "the status of the employee as a student performing the services shall
be determined on the basis of the relationship of such employee with the
organization for which the services are performed." 80  This relationship
consisted of four elements: enrollment, regular attendance, residents' purpose
for participating, and rendering services as an incident to and for the purpose of
pursuing a course of study.8' Again, the court used the Apfel case-by-case
approach in concluding that the relationship between Mayo and its residents
possessed all of these elements. Specifically, the court found that admittance
into the Mayo Graduate School of Medicine was based entirely on merit and
that the admissions process was fairly typical and determined that these facts
suggested that residents were "enrolled" as opposed to hired or contracted-for.82
The court also believed Mayo's various educational conferences, regularly
scheduled teaching rounds, and mandatory lecture attendance were sufficient
factors establishing that residents "regularly attended classes. 8 3 Regarding the
residents' purpose in participating in the GME programs, the court rejected the
Government's assertion that residency was nothing more than "on-the-job
training. '"84 "The former residents... consistently and credibly testified that
their purpose in enrolling in a residency program at Mayo was educational-to
gain the knowledge and skill necessary to practice in a specialty area of
medicine. 8 5 This, coupled with Mayo's "highly structured curricula," was
enough to establish an educational purpose for residents' enrollment.86 Lastly,
the Government challenged the Mayo-resident relationship on the basis that the
80. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(c) (1996); see also 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)
(2009) (providing for same inquiry).
81. Mayo 1, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 (D. Minn. 2003). The court analyzed each of these
elements independently. Id. at 1015-18.
82. Id. at 1015-16.
83. See id. at 1016-17 (rejecting the Government's argument that a minimum attendance
requirement was essential to the element of "regularly attending classes"). The court also noted
that the language of the regulation did not require that the student receive a degree for his
studies; rather, it need only be shown that the student be in pursuit of a course of study,
regardless of the eventuality of a degree. Id. at 1016.
84. Id. at 1017.
85. Id.; see also id. at 1001 n.8 ("Former residents [also] testified that, when they began
their residencies, they had no expectation of being hired by the Foundation as a staff physician
upon completion of their program.").
86. Id. at 1017. The Government also suggested that because residents engaged in
"moonlighting," they were fully capable of independent patient care. Id. The court disagreed:
Moonlighting was a source of income, not a training exercise. Id.
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substantial quantum of work which residents performed in the hospitals-in
some cases, upwards of eighty hours-necessarily dominated any "pursuit of a
course of study."87 Not only did this argument fail to acknowledge the close
nexus between patient care and resident education,88 the court found that care
provided by residents in the outpatient setting was subject to the review and
approval of staff physicians on duty.89 In the aggregate, the court found these
facts determinative of an educational relationship between Mayo and its
residents, and that, based on a fair and plain reading of the regulations, Mayo
residents were "students" for purposes of the exception.9"
4. What of These Opinions Should Survive?
The courts in both Apfel and Mayo I believed that review of legislative
history relating to the student exception was unnecessary. In their view, the
language of both § 3121(b)(10) and its implementing regulations was
sufficiently unambiguous such that resort to congressional evidence of intent
for terms like SCU or "student" was unwarranted. 91 Mayo I, however, displays
a key flaw on this point. Under generally accepted principles of administrative
law, a court should ask two questions when reviewing agency construction of a
statute which Congress has empowered that agency to administer: on the
precise question at issue, is Congress's intent clear; and if not, is the agency's
construction of the statute permissible.92 If Congress's intent is clear and
unambiguous, no further analysis is required.93 Courts will look to an agency's
87. See id. at 1018 (noting that most patients were seen by residents and the cost of those
services could be billed to Medicare and third parties).
88. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the interconnectivity
between educational goals and medical practice).
89. See United States v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Mayo 1), 282 F. Supp.
2d 997, 1018 (D. Minn. 2003) (quoting a Mayo resident's testimony regarding the supervisory
nature of the clinical training aspect of the GME program). "[T]he whole time that you are a
resident, there is someone looking over your shoulder that's responsible for what you do." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (noting that in reviewing
§ 3121 (b)(10)'s implementing regulations, the courts necessarily found the statute ambiguous as
to whether medical residents qualified for the exception).
92. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
93. See id. at 842-43 ("[Tihe court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."); see also United States v. Mount Sinai Med.
Ctr., 486 F.3d 1248, 1252 (1 1th Cir. 2007) ("The government's attempt to look past the plain
language of the statute in reliance on the legislative history violates a basic principle of statutory
interpretation."). The Eleventh Circuit in Mount Sinai reiterated the Chevron standard:
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construction of a statute only when Congress has failed to address directly the
question in dispute.94 Given his resort to the regulations, Judge Kyle's finding
that § 3121 (b)(10) was "not ambiguous" was, therefore, either improper or an
inadvertent misstatement of his actual belief. Were he truly to have read the
statute as unambiguous, reliance on agency construction would have been
unnecessary, and a determination of the exception's applicability to Mayo
residents would have relied solely upon the application of § 3121 (b)(10). But
as noted, the great substance of Mayo I focuses on an analysis of the
regulations.
This omission is problematic for taxpayers hoping to rely on Mayo I and
its disposition. Federal courts determining that the student exception was
inapplicable to medical residents as a matter of law95 found, as a preliminary
matter, the language of § 3121(b)(10) to be ambiguous.96  Whether those
analyses of § 3121(b)(10)'s ambiguity were without error is a separate
question; engaging in this famous Chevron "first prong" analysis is a necessary
first step to any regulatory review in cases where an agency's interpretation of a
statute is in dispute.97 That the Detroit Medical Center and Albany Medical
Center courts conducted this analysis arguably strengthens the internal
"[W]hen the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms." Id.
(quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)).
94. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 ("If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation."). The Court in Chevron went on to state: "Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. (emphasis added).
95. See Albany Med. Ctr. v. United States, No. 1:04-CV-1399, 2007 WL 119415, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2007) ("Although it is clear that residencies have an educational component,
it is equally clear that patient care in a hospital setting is a prominent concern. Therefore, it is
appropriate to review the history behind the legislation."); United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr.,
No. 05-71722, 2006 WL 3497312, at *10-11, *14 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 2006) (finding the
relevant treasury regulations ambiguous on the issue in dispute and that the exception's
legislative history required that medical residents be covered by FICA).
96. See Albany Med. Ctr., 2007 WL 119415, at *5 ("[W]hether a medical resident
qualifies as 'a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such school, college, or
university' is not a question that is resolvable by resorting to the text of IRC § 3121 alone.");
Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *8 ("The statute is unclear in a variety of ways:
whether a medical resident may be considered a student; whether a GME program may be
classified as a[n SCU]; and finally, whether the services provided by medical residents may be
considered services performed in the employ of the [SCU].").
97. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.").
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reasoning of those decisions and lends greater credibility to their legal
conclusions. Mayo I lacks such reasoned analysis on this particular issue.
While helpful to an understanding of Apfel's case-by-case approach, Mayo I
should be criticized for its failure to ask the truly important question: On the
precise issue of whether GME residents qualify for the student exception, is
Congress's intent clear?
Looking beyond this error, Mayo I stands for the proposition that, while
the language of § 3121 (b)(10) may be ambiguous, the Treasury's interpretative
regulations are clear and capable of answering unambiguously the question of
whether the student exception applies to medical residents. In other words,
Mayo I perpetuated Apfel's case-by-case approach, while keeping the analysis
within the limits of regulatory language. Under this approach, statutory and
legislative histories are irrelevant.
B. The Minority Approach: Detroit Medical Center
In 2006, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan took a
different stance than the Apfel and Mayo I courts, relying on what it believed to
be a clear congressional intent to include all medical residents under FICA.9 s
In United States v. Detroit Medical Center,99 the Government brought suit
against the Detroit Medical Center (DMC) for repayment of Social Security tax
refunds which DMC had requested successfully in 2003.1°° In responding to
the Government's repayment action, DMC offered two grounds for claiming
entitlement to the refund, one of which was its assertion that the student
exemption should be held applicable to DMC's medical residents (the precise
argument advanced by the taxpayer in Mayo 1).101
98. See Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *12 ("To exempt medical residents
conflicts with Congress' intent to have young doctors covered by Social Security as shown by
the statutory history.").
99. See id. at *14 (granting summary judgment in favor of the United States and finding
student exception from FICA taxation inapplicable to stipends paid by defendant to their
medical residents).
100. Id. at *1. DMC had based its original refund petition on the theory that its medical
residents qualified for the student exemption under § 312 l(b)(10). Id.
101. See id. (noting DMC's introduction of the argument that the stipends constituted
"noncompensatory scholarships"). The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
rejected DMC's scholarship theory, noting that even if DMC's program was "educational in
nature.... the residents' stipends [were] given as a substantial quidpro quo for patient care."
Id. at *4. DMC also brought a counterclaim against the United States for denials of FICA
refunds for taxable years 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002, and 2003. Id. at *1.
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To begin with, the court noted two important legal principles that would
guide its analysis:10 2 first, that "the terms 'employment' and 'wages' are to
be broadly construed since the very words, 'any service ... performed... for
his employer,' with the purpose of the Social Security Act in mind, import a
breadth of coverage";' 0 3 and second-related to this concept of broad
statutory construction-that "the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing a
tax exemption."' 104 With these in mind, the court looked to the jurisprudential
landscape of student exemptions in the Tax Code: "Since the ruling inApfel,
there have been two distinct approaches that the district courts have
102. See id. at *5 (noting the importance of"consider[ing] general principles of coverage
under Social Security as directed by the Supreme Court").
103. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358,
365 (1946)); see also United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1947) ("The very specificity
of the exemptions, however, and the generality of the employment definitions indicates that the
terms 'employment' and 'employee,' are to be construed to accomplish the purpose of the
legislation... [and] a constricted interpretation... would not comport with [the court's]
purpose."). But see 42 U.S.C. § 4100)(2) (2000) (noting that the term "employee" should be
understood as "any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in
determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee") (emphasis
added); Grantham v. Beatrice Co., 776 F. Supp. 391, 396 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("[E]ven if
Congress at one point intended.., the [Social Security Administration] ... to have a broader
sweep than the common law definition of'employee' would allow, Congress no longer has such
an intention.").
104. United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 05-71722, 2006 WL 3497312, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 1, 2006) ("[E]xemptions from taxation are not to be implied; they must be
unambiguously proved." (quoting United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354
(1988))). This narrow view of tax exemptions emanates almost exclusively from cases dealing
with provisions found within the revenue and estate tax chapters of the Internal Revenue Code.
For example, the issue in Wells Fargo was whether an exemption from state and federal estate
tax liability could be implied from federal statutes outside the Internal Revenue Code and
evidence of congressional intent. Wells Fargo, 485 U.S. at 355. The Court, employing a canon
of strict construction traditionally associated with tax exemptions, refused to imply the
exemption. Id. at 359; cf U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939)
("Exemptions from taxation do not rest upon implication."). Because the objectives of the FICA
and revenue tax schemes are different, see supra note 73, an argument could be made that the
standards by which courts review exemptions found within those tax schemes should reflect
those differences. But see United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222
(S.D. Fla. 2005) ("Courts are to err on the side of including employees in the system unless an
exemption is beyond question." (emphasis added)); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712
(1947) ("As the federal social security legislation is an attack on recognized evils in our national
economy, a constricted interpretation of the phrasing by the courts would not comport with its
purpose."). The Silk Court further noted: "Such an interpretation would only make for a
continuance, to a considerable degree, of the difficulties for which the remedy was devised and
would invite adroit schemes by some employers and employees to avoid the immediate burdens
at the expense of the benefits sought by the legislation." Id. at 711-12.
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employed when handling [similar] cases."' 0 5 The court began its survey of
this case law with a review of the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Apfel.' 6
The Detroit Medical Center court recognized that the Apfel approach
had become the analytical instrument employed by a majority of the district
courts which had considered the student exemption issue. 0 7 These district
courts "determined based merely on either the [exemption] statute's language
or [its] language as interpreted by the Treasury Regulations, [that] GME
programs may establish through a facts and circumstances inquiry that their
residents qualify for the student exemption," as seen in the Apfel case-by-case
approach. 10 8
The minority approach, as employed here,' 9 generally looks beyond the
plain language of the exemption statute and its interpretive regulations to find
the student exemption inapplicable to medical residents as a matter of law.' 10
In arriving at this conclusion (and notably without substantial supportive
reasoning), the Detroit Medical Center court determined that the treasury
regulation was ambiguous as to whether a GME program properly fell within
105. Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *8.
106. Id. at *6-7. For an overview of the Apfel decision, see supra Part II.A.
107. See Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *8 ("A majority of district courts, relying
on Apfel, have determined that... GME programs may establish through a facts and
circumstances inquiry that their residents qualify for the student exception."). In support of this
assertion, the court cited four cases which utilized the majority approach: Univ. of Chi. Hosps.
v. United States, No. 05 C 5120, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68695 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2006); Ctr.
for Family Med. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (D.S.D. 2006); United States v. Univ.
Hosp., Inc., No. 1:05CV445, 2006 WL 1173455 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29,2006); and United States
v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 282 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Minn. 2003). Id at *8 &
n. 1.
108. Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *8 (emphasis added).
109. Id. The court determined that the regulations interpreting the student exemption were
ambiguous on the issue of whether GME programs should "fall under the commonly or
generally accepted meaning of the term 'school, college or university,"' and distinguished the
programs as educational only to the extent they were comparable to apprenticeships. Id. at *10.
The court also found the regulations ambiguous as to whether medical residents were in fact
"students" under the exemption. Id. at *11. Finding little difference between the language of
the statute and its interpretative regulation, the court stated: "[I]t is unclear whether a medical
residents' [sic] ... work involved at the hospitals may be considered 'incident to' or 'for the
purposes of study.' It is more likely that a medical resident's study is incident to and for the
purposes of work." Id. The court focused its analysis on the statutory history and legislative
intent of the student exemption in the context of the Social Security Act. Id. at *11-14.
110. This approach was first established in United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center.
See United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1230 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
(finding "as a matter of law, medical residents are not students who are exempt from FICA
taxation"). Looking to a legislative history from 1939, the court was persuaded that "Congress
made clear that the intern exception did not apply to residents." Id. at 1223.
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the meaning of an SCU.111 Further, the court found the regulation ambiguous
as to whether residents were "students" under § 3121 (b)(10),'12 arguing that the
language of the regulation lacked any guidance as it was too similar to the
language of its related statute." 3 Therefore, resort to the history of the student
exception and discussion of the developments of the Social Security Act from
the time of its enactment in 1935 were, in the court's view, proper."
4
The court first turned to Congress's 1965 repeal of the student intern
exception, which Congress enacted concurrent with the student exception in
1939.15 Such action, the court believed, was evidence that Congress intended
to protect, through FICA coverage, all "actual and future doctors once their
111. See Detroit Med. Ctr.,2006 WL 3497312, at * 10 ("Although GME programs provide
a type of education to their residents, they are educational in a way similar to an apprenticeship
or a position that involves on the job training."). Note how differently this court views "on-the-
job training" in the context of GME programs from the court in Mayo . See supra notes 55-57
and accompanying text (discussing residents' motivation for participating in Mayo's GME
program). Moreover, the Detroit Medical Center court seems not to be persuaded by the
"interconnectivity" aspect of residency education. See supra note 76 and accompanying text
(discussing Mayo's emphasis on the importance of kinesthetic learning).
112. See Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 1,2006) (finding
it "unclear whether a medical residents' [sic] extensive amount of work involved at the hospitals
may be considered 'incident to' or 'for the purposes of study.' It is more likely that a medical
resident's study is incident to and for the purposes of work." (emphasis added)).
113. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,260-64 (2006) (distinguishing Chevron
and Skidmore in refusing to show deference to interpretive rules when an agency, after
promulgating legislative rules containing language identical to its controlling statute, then
subsequently relied upon such interpretive rules-which were not subject to a formal
rulemaking process-for implementation of the statute).
114. Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *ll-13. The court rejected DMC's
argument that use of extrinsic evidence was improper under Exxon Mobil Corporation v.
Allapattah Services. See id. ("Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to
the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise
ambiguous terms." (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546 (2005))).
The Detroit Medical Center court notes that every other federal court deciding this issue (with
one exception) has looked beyond § 3121 (b)(l 0) itself, implying that all courts have found the
statute ambiguous on its face. Id. at *9. The court's reasoning, however, is not readily
apparent. It would seem that any application of the student exception would require an
understanding of the program seeking to invoke the same. While the Detroit Medical Center
court would like to reject the case-by-case approach of Apfel, it seems to be engaging in just that
here. "[I]t is generally accepted that GME programs are not generally considered 'schools,
colleges, or universities,' no matter what organization places its name on the program." Id. at
* 10 (emphasis added).
115. Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *12 (noting that in 1939, Congress
recognized a difference between students and medical interns as well as between resident
doctors and medical interns). "The legislative history of the 1939 Amendment in the form of a
House Report explained the intern exception covered only an intern, 'as distinguished from a
resident doctor."' Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 76-728, at 550-51 (1939)).
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undergraduate schooling [was] complete."'"1 6 This argument, however, appears
misguided. It is generally accepted that the concept of"intem" is no longer part
of the medical education construct."i7 While intems and resident doctors might
once have been separate and distinct labels for "young doctors," that distinction
no longer exists. 1 8 And the Detroit Medical Center court's statement-" [a]t
no time did medical residents qualify for the student exception or any other
exception"-seems conclusory. While Apfel appears to be the first case in
which the student exception made its appearance in conjunction with GME
programs and medical residents, this in no way suggests the general student
exception was previously unavailable to medical residents. American graduate
medical education has seen significant change over the past sixty years, and the
Detroit Medical Center court's reliance on anachronistic distinctions arguably
116. Id.
117. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (describing three types of generally
recognized residency programs, including a transitional year program designed for residents
who have not decided on a specialty of medicine). The transitional year program seems to be
the only remnant of what Congress referred to as an "intern" in 1939.
118. See United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 05-71722, 2006 WL 3497312, at *13
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 2006) ("[T]he statutory construction, the statutory history and the
legislative history make clear that students, interns, residents-in-training, and physicians fit
under separate categories that are not meant to overlap."). The courts posited that, because
Congress created "independent" exemptions for students, interns and residents, qualification for
one exemption necessarily barred that taxpayer from qualifying under another--the exemptions
were in effect mutually exclusive. Id. Relying on a 1939 House Report, the court also drew a
distinction between medical residents and medical interns. Id. "Allowing medical residents to
now fall under the student exception .... even though medical interns would not be permitted
to fall under the student exception due to the principles of statutory construction would thwart
congressional intent." Id. (emphasis added). But see United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr.,
353 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (noting taxpayer's argument that Congress
repealed the intern exception in 1965 because "the service-oriented intern of 1939 no longer
existed"). The Mount Sinai court defined an intern as "a resident in his or her first year of
training out of medical school." Id. at 1219. In light of the court's overall analysis, this
statement is problematic. Not only does this definition contain terms which the court itself
endeavored to define (namely "resident"), but its reasoning is completely circular: If a medical
resident "is a person who has received [a terminal] degree and is undergoing further training in a
medical ... specialty," id., then an "intern"--i.e., "a resident in his or her first year of
training"-will always constitute a "medical resident." If one accepts the notion that
"exclusions from coverage that were adopted in 1939 were very narrowly drafted," id. at 1224,
and that students, interns, and residents were intended to "fit under separate categories ... not
meant to overlap," Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at * 13, an intern would never qualify
for FICA exemption under the intern exception provision. The court asserts that "[i]nterpreting
the student exception to include medical residents would violate the rule that no statute should
be read in such a way as to make any of its provisions superfluous." Mount Sinai, 353 F. Supp.
2d at 1229 (emphasis added). But an adoption of the court's reading of the statute would, in
fact, make the intern exception provision superfluous, which was the court's very concern with
finding the student exception applicable to residents. Id. at 1228.
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was improper. Nevertheless, the court stated that, while applicability of the
student exception, in the wake of the repeal of the intern exception, indeed may
have some merit, it was for Congress-and not the judiciary-to make such a
clarification. 19 Accordingly, the court found that, as a matter of law, the
student exception under § 3121(b)(10) was inapplicable to DMC and its
medical residents.12
0
II. The Tax Scheme
A. Social Security Act of 1935 and the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
The framers of Social Security contemplated several models of providing
social insurance, specifically as to whether the program should be funded, in
part, by contributions made by the federal government (wholly separate from
the collection of the withheld payroll taxes), or whether the program should be
entirely self-supporting. 12' Drafters considered the idea that employers with
private pension plans could opt-out of social insurance coverage. 122 Congress
ultimately settled on an old-age insurance program which would be entirely
self-supporting,123 funded by both employee and employer contributions, 124 and
which omitted any voluntary abstention provisions.1
25
In 1939, the tax withholding provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935
were repealed, only to be re-enacted the same year as the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA).126 The current Social Security system operates under
FICA, with important modifications. 127 The 1939 amendments had significant
effects on the functioning of the program and its overall goals: "[T]he program
moved away from the individualistic equity goals in the 1935 Act toward the goal
of providing adequate benefits. Over the years, debate has continued over the
relative weight that the equity and adequacy goals of the program should
119. Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *13.
120. Id. at* 14.
121. SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN, THE REAL DEAL: THE HISTORY AND
FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURIrY 38 (1999).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 40-41.
124. Id. at 33.
125. Id. at 38.
126. Id. at64.
127. See H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 1939-2 C.B. 538 (1939) ("The
present bill is designed to widen the scope and to improve the adequacy and the administration
of these [social welfare] programs without altering their essential features.").
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receive." 128 One significant modification to the Act was the adoption of the
student exception.
B. History of the Student Exception
The student exception provision of § 3121 (b)(10) existed in a different
form when Congress first enacted it in 1939 under FICA.'29 The 1939 version
of the exception read:
The term "employment" means any service of whatever nature, performed
within the United States by an employee for his employer, except...
(8) [s]ervice performed in any calendar quarter in the employ of any
organization exempt from income tax under section 101 of the Internal
Revenue Code, if... (iii) such service is performed by a student who is
enrolled and is regularly attending classes at a school, college, or
university. 1
30
Contemporaneous legislative intent regarding the 1939 student exemption is
sparse, but one comment is particularly pertinent to the issue discussed in this
Note:
In order to eliminate the nuisance of inconsequential tax payments the bill
excludes certain services performed for fraternal benefit societies and other
non-profit institutions exempt from income tax, and certain other groups.
While the earnings of a substantial number of persons are excluded from
this recommendation, the total amount of earnings involved is undoubtedly
very small.... The intent of the amendment is to exclude those persons
and those organizations in which the employment is part-time or
intermittent and the total amount of earnings is only nominal, and the
payment of the tax is inconsequential and a nuisance. The benefit rights
built up are also inconsequential. Many of those affected, such as
students ... will have other employment which will enable them to develop
insurance benefits. This amendment, therefore, should simplify the
administration for the worker, the employer, and the Government.
The government's motivation for including this exception appears to have been
a fear that the costs to society associated with the collection of taxes from
employees (and their employers) receiving minimal compensation would
128. SCHIEBER& SHovEN, supra note 121, at 59.
129. See Federal Insurance Contributions Act of 1939,26 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1431 (imposing
additional tax on both employees and their employers).
130. Id. § 1426(b).
131. H.R. REP.No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 1939-2 C.B. 538, 543 (1939) (emphasis
added).
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exceed any FICA revenue from such collection, thus creating inefficiency in the
overall program. The importance of establishing an economical social welfare
system was recognized from the beginning of the Act, along with a need
constantly to reassess the program in order to discover possible areas of
weakness and opportunities for improvement.
132
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 also delegated rulemaking authority to
the Secretary of the Treasury for purposes of administering the tax collection
process. 33 In 1940, the Secretary promulgated regulations under FICA, 34
which stated in pertinent part:
Services performed ... by a student in the employ of a school, college, or
university not exempt from income tax under section 101 of the Internal
Revenue Code are excepted, provided: (a) The services are performed by a
student who is enrolled and is regularly attending classes at such school,
college, or university; and (b) The remuneration for such services
performed... does not exceed $45.135
132. See id. ("Tremendous as is the scope of [the Social Security] program, it was
recognized from the beginning that changes would have to be made as experience and study
indicated lines of revision and improvement.").
133. See 26 U.S.C. § 1429 (1939) ("Secretary shall make and publish such rules and
regulations... as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the functions with which
he is charged under this subchapter. The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary,
shall make and publish rules and regulations for the enforcement of this subchapter."). Under
current law, the Secretary of the Treasury can issue two types of regulations: legislative
regulations pursuant to specific congressional delegation; or interpretive regulations pursuant to
the Secretary's general rulemaking authority under 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a). See 26 U.S.C.
§ 7805(a) (2000) ("[T]he Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of
any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.").
134. The 1940 regulations were promulgated under title II of the Social Security Act and
amendments effective prior to January 1, 1940. See 20 C.F.R. § 403.1 (a), Introductory (1940).
Note also that the regulations relating to benefits provided for under title II of the Social
Security Act were originally promulgated under § 402 of title 20 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. See id. § 403.1 (b), Introductory (1940).
135. 20 C.F.R. § 403.821 (1940). The regulations further explained:
[T]he type of services performed by the employee and the place where the services
are performed are immaterial; the statutory tests are the character of the
organization in whose employ the services are performed, the amount of
remuneration for services performed by the employee in the calendar quarter, and
the status of the employee as a student enrolled and regularly attending classes at
the school, college, or university in whose employ he performs the services. The
term "school, college, or university" within the meaning of this exception is to be
taken in its commonly or generally accepted sense.
Id. (emphasis added).
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This regulation reflects the stated legislative intent of the 1939 amendments
inasmuch as it prescribes a nominal amount requirement for the exception to
apply.136  However, the nominal amount requirement was abandoned by
Congress in 1950 when the various student exclusions of the 1939 amendments
were consolidated into one student exception provision. 137 The Government
has argued that Congress's intent, as first espoused in 1939, to limit the student
exclusion to those whose "total amount of earnings is only nominal" should
control any current reading of the statute. 138  Federal courts, however,
consistently have rejected this position, noting that the applicable treasury
regulations unambiguously omit a nominal amount requirement. 1
39
On January 16, 1998, the IRS released Revenue Procedure 98-16, which
established standards for determining whether services performed by students
in the employ of institutions of higher education would qualify for the student
136. But see Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 606,53 Stat.
1360, 1385 (1939) ("Service performed... in the employ of an organization exempt from
income tax under section 101, if the remuneration for such service does not exceed $45, or...
such service is performed by a student who is enrolled and is regularly attending classes at a
school, college, or university." (emphasis added)). Note the absence of a nominal amount
requirement in the latter part of this regulation.
137. See Univ. of Chi. Hosps. v. United States, No. 05 C 5120, 2006 WL 2631974, at *4
(N.D. I11. Sept. 8, 2006) ("Moreover, in 1950, when Congress consolidated the student
exclusions, it opted not to include any limitation on renumeration [sic] but maintained it for the
exclusion for wages eamed at a nonprofit organization." (citing Social Security Act
Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, § 204(a), 64 Stat. 477, 531 (1950))).
138. See id. at *3 (noting Government's reliance on the 1939 House Report discussing the
amendments to the Social Security Act of 1935); United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 05-
71722, 2006 WL 3497312, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 2006) (discussing Government's
argument that prior court rulings finding nominal amount requirement for a similar "student
nurse" exception demanded similar treatment of the general student exception).
139. See Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 2006 WL 2631974, at *3 ("In this case, the Treasury
Regulation at issue.., clearly states that the amount of renumeration [sic] earned by an
individual is immaterial to the applicability of the student exclusion."). The court further noted
that, "[b]ecause the plain language of the Treasury Regulation is clear, there is no need to resort
to other sources, such as the agency's interpretation of its regulation or the legislative history of
the underlying statute, to determine its meaning." Id. (citations omitted). See also Det. Med
Cr., 2006 WL 3497312, at *10 (agreeing with the district court in University of Chicago
Hospitals that the regulation "unambiguously does not include a nominal compensation
requirement"). In Detroit Medical Center, the Government urged the court to review the student
exception in the context of the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the student "nurse exception," which
was enacted concurrently with the general student exception in 1939. Id. In Johnson City
Medical Center v. United States, the Sixth Circuit faced the question of what, if any, deference
should be given to an IRS agency ruling. Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d
973, 975-78 (6th Cir. 1993). A majority of the court held that the IRS ruling was entitled to
Chevron deference and that the nominal amount requirement was a valid exercise of the IRS's
agency power. Id. at 977-98.
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exception. 14 The Revenue Procedure categorically rejected the application of
§ 3121(b)(10) to medical residents, finding the services of such "students"
incapable of being "incidental to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of
study.'
41
This IRS policy was challenged later that year in Apfel when the State of
Minnesota brought an action against the Commissioner of Social Security for
redetermination of the state's liability for FICA tax contributions. 42 As noted
above, the Eighth Circuit, affirming the lower court, held in favor of the
taxpayer, finding in part that medical residents at the University of Minnesota
were employed by the University, their services were compensated in the form
of stipends, and that the residents were "students" under the Section 218
agreement, thus overruling much of the substance of Revenue Procedure 98-
16 43 The effect of this ruling was a polarization of the issue-the IRS had
been beaten twice on the student exception question, which forced them to
review the language of the relevant regulations, and institutions similar to the
Mayo Foundation were given great incentive to seek FICA refunds.
C. Amendments to Regulations After Mayo I
On February 25, 2004, the IRS responded to Mayo I by publishing its
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend the regulations defining
"student" and "school, college, or university." 144 The IRS was concerned
that residency programs were akin to "on-the-job training" and were not
properly included under the FICA student exception. 145 Furthermore, the
IRS sought to resurrect the "primary purpose" test rejected by the court in
Mayo I. 46 Prior to the 2004 amendments, the regulations stated: "The term
140. Rev. Proc. 98-16, 1998-1 C.B. 403 (Feb. 2, 1998).
141. Id. at 2.02.
142. See Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742,748 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's
ruling in favor of Minnesota). For an overview of the Apfel decision, see supra Part II.A.
143. Apfel, 151 F.3d at 747-48.
144. See Student FICA Exception, 69 Fed. Reg. 8604 (proposed Feb. 25, 2004).
145. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States (Mayo fl), 503 F. Supp.
2d 1164, 1168 (D. Minn. 2007) (discussing the IRS's motivation for readdressing those issues
which had been "resolved" by both the Eighth Circuit in Apfel and the district court in Mayo 1).
146. See 69 Fed. Reg. 8604, 8605-06 (declaring that the primary purpose standard,
notwithstanding its rejection by Mayo I, "is consistent with the language of section 3121 (b)(10)
and the existing regulations thereunder, and is consistent with the intended scope of the student
FICA exception"); see also infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text (discussing factors which
Judge Kyle considered in finding medical residents properly excluded from FICA tax liability
and specifically rejecting the "primary purpose" test).
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'school, college, or university' within the meaning of [the student exception]
is to be taken in its commonly or generally accepted sense." 147  Final
regulations were published on December 21, 2004 (effective April 1, 2005),
amending the regulations relating to § 3121(b)(10).148 These final amended
regulations stated:
An organization is a school, college or university within the meaning of
section 3121 (b)(10) if its primary function is the presentation of formal
instruction, it normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum, and it
normally has a regularly enrolled body of students in attendance at the
place where its educational activities are regularly carried on. 49
This primary function test was again rejected by Judge Kyle in Mayo
Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States (Mayo fl).5
Readopting the familiar case-by-case analysis, Judge Kyle noted that "[w]hether
an organization qualifies as a 'school, college, or university' is a factual
inquiry."' 151 The amended regulations also included a full-time employee
exception declaring that "an employee whose normal work schedule is 40 hours
or more per week is considered a full-time employee."' 52 Services performed
by that taxpayer, therefore, were "not incident to and for the purpose of
pursuing a course of study."' 53 Further, "the fact that the services performed by
the employee may have an educational, instructional, or training aspect" will
not affect the "normal work schedule.' 54 As the Mayo 1I court noted, the
student exception would be inapplicable to medical residents working over
forty hours per week.155
Judicial review of interpretive tax regulations are governed by the
Supreme Court's decision in National Muffler Dealers Association, Inc. v.
United States.156 "In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the
147. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) (2003).
148. Rules & Regulations, Student FICA Exemption, 69 Fed. Reg. 76404-01 (Dec. 21,
2004).
149. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(c) (2008) (emphasis added).
150. See Mayo II, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (invalidating the primary function test as
inconsistent with a plain reading of the student exception statute).
151. Id. at 1173; see also United States v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Mayo
1), 282 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 2003) (noting Government's failure to persuade the
court that a case-by-case analysis was improper).
152. 26C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States (Mayo II), 503 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1169 (D. Minn. 2003).
156. See Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,484 (1979) (finding
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congressional mandate in a proper manner, [the courts] look to see whether the
regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its
purpose." 157 Unsurprisingly, consistent with his decision in Mayo I, Judge Kyle
held that the language of § 3121(b)(10) was uncomplicated and
"straightforward."' 58  Noting that neither Congress nor the IRS had ever
indicated that a "primary function" test should apply in determining an
employer's status as an SCU, 59 the court invalidated those amendments
relating to that test. 6° Under a similar rationale, Judge Kyle also invalidated
the "full-time employee" exception, stating that it was "inconsistent with the
plain meaning of the statute and [was] arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable."' 61 The practical effect of the Mayo II ruling, therefore, was to
return the regulations to the form in which they existed prior to April 1, 2005
(the effective date of the amendments), safe-if only temporarily-from IRS
modification.
D. What Now?
The history of the student exception's development makes it quite clear
that the IRS is as dead-set on requiring medical residents to contribute to Social
Security as the medical community is in seeking to qualify for the exemption.
From relying on outdated legislative history to amending its regulations in a
manner directly adverse to medical residents and their GME sponsors, 162 the
IRS's position might fairly be characterized as punitive. Furthermore, the
that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's reading of an exemption statute was a reasonable,
although not exclusive, construction of Congress's intent, and accordingly was entitled to
"serious deference").
157. Id. at 477.
158. Mayo II, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (citing United States v. Mayo Found. for Med.
Educ. & Research (Mayo 1), 282 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1007, 1013 (D. Minn. 2003)); see also United
States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 486 F.3d 1248, 1251 (1lth Cir. 2007) (finding error with
district court's review of "legislative history without first determining whether the language of
the statute was ambiguous").
159. Mayo 11, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 n.7.
160. Id. at 1174.
161. See id. at 1174-75 ("The full-time employee exception arbitrarily narrows this
definition by providing that a 'full-time' employee is not a 'student' even if the educational
aspect of an employee's service predominates over the service aspect."). "A natural reading of
the full text in which the term 'student' appears demonstrates that an employee is a 'student' so
long as the educational aspect of his service predominates over the service aspect of the
relationship with his employer." Id. at 1175.
162. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text (reviewing language of the 2004
amendments to 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)).
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federal courts have been less than helpful in arbitrating the central disagreement
of whether § 3 12 1 (b)(1 0) is ambiguous.163 Given the divergence between the
courts' respective rationales, resolution of this issue is unlikely to come from
judicial action. Certain truths are inescapable: the language of the student
exception is undeniably minimal; evidence of Congress's intent is lacking; and,
so long as this issue remains unresolved, total litigation costs will continue to
rise. 164
If one accepts the idea that § 3121(b)(10) (or at the very least, its
interpretive regulations) is unambiguous, it could be argued that, despite
FICA's widely acknowledged broad reach, 165 the fact that Congress penned the
student exception with such plain language is a reflection of Congress's intent
of wide application, thus requiring an understanding of the practical difficulties
in constructing a law whose reach is far, but whose language is precise. Such is
the dilemma with § 3121 (b)(10). This Note focuses on the applicability of this
exclusion with respect to medical residents, but the volume of individuals who
potentially qualify for this exclusion is large. It would be overly cumbersome
to require Congress to enumerate perfectly every set of circumstances that
would (or would not) satisfy the requirements of the student exclusion. Such
legal perfection is as unreasonable as it is impossible-no matter how
comprehensive the exception provision could be written, there will always be a
set of circumstances unanticipated by the legislature. So, absent confidence in
the judiciary, the IRS, and taxpayers in the medical community to find a
resolution, to whom should the law turn?
The majority approach requires a case-by-case analysis every time a
taxpayer 166 seeks (or the United States challenges) a refund for FICA taxes
under the student exemption. 167 While this Note has argued that such an
approach is preferable to any alternatives currently employed by the federal
courts, the unique characteristics of the GME programs suggest that, as a
practical matter, these programs should be afforded the presumption of
163. Compare supra Part II.A (presenting the majority view of the courts that declares
§ 3121 (b)(1)'s language unambiguous), with supra Part II.B (presenting the minority view of
the courts that declares the language ambiguous).
164. This is especially true if a majority of the courts continue to employ the Apfel
approach, since a case-by-case analysis requires a trial, whereas the minority approach can be-
and often has been-subject to summary judgment.
165. See, e.g., supra notes 104-05 (presenting the view that FICA has a broad statutory
coverage).
166. The use of "taxpayer" refers, of course, to either a medical resident oran organization
sponsoring a GME program.
167. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (introducing the majority case-by-case
approach established in Apfel).
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qualifying as a "school, college, or university," and residents the presumption
of "student" status.
IV Tax Policy
As can be gathered from the preceding discussion, tax law is indeed a
complex amalgamation of several familiar jurisprudential sources. The
common substantive elements of mostly all legal disciplines--statutory
authority, administrative directive, and judicial interpretation and doctrine-are
of undeniable importance to the tax field.168 Beyond these, however, there
exists an additional source of authority the appreciation of which is crucial to
the resolution of any tax-related dispute: Policy. For example, it has been said
that "[tlax law is based on the moral notion that joint action implies joint
payment for the instrumentalities of action."169 In the context of Social
Security, taxpayer protection against future economic hardship (such as
decreased earning potential resulting from old-age, disability, or the loss of a
spousal wage-earner) comes at the price of our mutual contribution to the
Social Security system. 170 Due to these uncertainties of life, taxpayers are
encouraged to contribute into the system as soon as they become eligible.
171
The history of Social Security indicates that the drafters of current social
welfare policies strived to implement a system with requirements that were as
equitable as possible to taxpayers. 72 However, very few individuals actually
receive benefits commensurate with their share of contribution into that system:
168. See generally supra Part II (displaying the interrelation of all these elements in tax
law).
169. Thomas C. Folsom, Evaluating Supernatural Law: An Inquiry into the Health of
Nations (The Restatement of the Obvious Part II), 21 REGENT U. L. REv. 105, 151 (2009).
170. See 1939-2 C.B. 538 (June 2, 1939) ("The enactment of the Social Security Act
marked a new era, the Federal Government accepting, for the first time, responsibility for
providing a systematic program of protection against economic and social hazards.").
171. See, e.g., Social Security: Coverage for Medical Residents, G.A.O. No. B-284947, at
9 (Aug. 31, 2000) [hereinafter GAO MEMO], available at http://www.gao.gov (noting
Administration's belief "that treating residents as students could have other potential
consequences for the medical residents, such as not earning credits toward retirement, survivor
and disability benefits"); United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d
1217, 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (noting the importance of Social Security coverage for young
professionals because "in the early years of their practice, [they] may not otherwise have the
means to provide adequate survivorship and disability protection for themselves and their
families"); cf GAO MEMO, infra, at 9 ("It is unlikely, however, that treating medical residents as
students would have a significant effect on their retirement benefits.").
172. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing considerations of equity and
adequacy in establishing a social welfare system).
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While Social Security aims to protect all participants, in practice, it does so at a
disproportionate rate of return. 173  And while such disconnect between
contribution and benefits eligibility might seem inequitable, it is not necessarily
in contravention of the broader goals of Social Security.' 74 Perhaps in response
to this problem of cosmetic inequity, Congress included various exceptions and
qualifications to the FICA regime in order to remedy the initial inequity of the
new welfare system. These choices on how best to align contribution with the
receipt of benefits were matters of policy. However, legislative history relating
to specific examples of such exceptions and qualifications is quite limited,
particularly with regard to the student exception under § 3121(b)(10). 175 A
review of American GME programs supports the proposal that GME programs
and their residents should be presumptively exempt from FICA tax liability.
V. American Graduate Medical Education Programs
An analysis of American GME programs-from both the perspective of
the sponsoring institution and the residents themselves-suggests that medical
residents presumptively qualify for the student exception under § 3121 (b)(10).
However, Congress, the IRS, and nearly every federal court dealing with this
issue have failed to address this argument, perhaps because a detailed review of
GME program requirements, established by the Accreditation Council for
Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), rarely has played a role in attempted
resolutions of the issue.
GMEs in the United States focus on the education and training of doctors
who have graduated recently with an M.D. from a university (usually consisting
of four years of study).176 These GMEs offer new doctors opportunities to
focus on a specific field of medical practice-general surgery, anesthesiology,
173. See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and
Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAx REv. 1, 38 (2002) (noting both the cross-
generational and intra-generational redistributive effects on the return on Social Security
benefits from payment into that welfare system).
174. See id. at 27, 39 (noting that while it may be easier politically to pitch Social Security
taxes as a payment into a mandatory, government-sponsored pension plan, in reality, taxes paid
into Social Security are more accurately characterized as "supporting society-wide goals and
benefits rather than merely individualized cash benefits").
175. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (reviewing 1939 House Report on the
amendments to the Social Security Act of 1935).
176. See ACGME-PotuciES AND PRocEDumES 63 (Feb. 9,2009) [hereinafter PoLcMS &
PROCEDURES], available at http://www.acgme.org ("A residency program is a structured
educational activity comprising a series of learning experiences in GME designed to conform to
the program requirements of a particular specialty.").
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or internal medicine, to name a few-and vary in length depending on the
requirements of the sponsoring institution, the character of the chosen field, and
standards established by the ACGME. 177 The ACGME recognizes three types
of "residency programs" under the broad definition of the term. 78 These are:
the traditional residency program, which serves as a continuation of the M.D.
educational process; the subspecialty program, which narrows the resident's
focus in his or her specialty; and the transition year program, which is designed
to allow residents more of an opportunity to experience different specialties
before committing to one specific program.
179
Administrators of GMEs must balance important and potentially
conflicting interests in establishing the structure of their programs. These
interests include clinical experience, instruction and self-study time, continuity
of care, and the avoidance of resident fatigue.1
80
A. The Focus of GME Programs is Primarily Educational
In 2001, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
heard a petition by the American Medical Association and others requesting,
inter alia, the adoption of a limitation on maximum work hours for medical
residents.' 8 ' ACGME's institutional standards currently contain many of that
petition's proposals, specifically an eighty-hour limitation on residents' duty
hours, one day off from all educational and clinical work for every seven days
in rotation, and mandatory ten-hour break periods between call periods. 8 2 The
177. "The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) is a separately
incorporated non-governmental organization responsible for the accreditation of Graduate
Medical Education (GME) programs." Id. at 1. The ACGME has five member organizations or
agencies: the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), the American Hospital
Association (AHA), the American Medical Association (AMA), the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC), and the Council of Medical Specialty Societies (CMSS). Id.
178. Id. at 63.
179. Id. at 63-64.
180. See Debra F. Weinstein, Duty Hours for Resident Physicians-Tough Choices for
Teaching Hospitals, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1275, 1275 (2002) (discussing problems associated
with ACGME's limit on residents' work hours).
181. See OSHA Rejects Medical Residents'Petition for 80-Hour Workweek, Bus. & LEGAL
REPORTS, Oct. 25,2002, available at http://safety.blr.com/news.aspx?id=89365 (noting OSHA's
rejection of petitioners' request on ground that ACGME was better and more appropriately
suited to address issue of excessive duty hours and limitations thereon). "In June 2002, the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), which accredits nearly 8,000
residency programs in the United States, set new standards on resident work hours." Id.
182. See ACGME-COMMON PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 13-14 (July 1, 2007) [hereinafter
REQunREMENTs], available at http://www.acgme.org (providing language on duty work hour
1400
THE IMPOSSIBLE STUDENT EXCEPTION
medical community frequently has voiced its concern over the safety of medical
residents dealing with over-work and fatigue, 183 and the duty work hour
limitations appear to have been adopted by ACGME with the aim of remedying
this problem. However, the limitation creates a dilemma for GME
administrators, as a reduction in hours risks a reduction in the amount of time
residents spend on educational activities.'
84
Arguably, one view of the role of medical residents in teaching hospitals is
that they provide a form of "cheap labor" because their services may be
substituted for those of faculty members whose compensation is commensurate
with their level of experience and education.18 5 Of course, the residents are
supervised, and most decisions made by residents in the course of administering
patient care are subject to the approval of a faculty physician. 8 6 This concept
of resident cheap labor, however, was not a product of design; rather, that
residents can be used by teaching hospitals to lower their overall costs
associated with patient care merely reflects a natural allocation of the skills of
hospitals' various caregivers. 1
7
Despite this phenomenon, the focus of American GME programs always
has been a commitment to the educational and clinical development of young
doctors. This is particularly apparent in the context of ACGME's position on
duty work hours. "The program must be committed to and be responsible for
promoting patient safety and resident well-being and to providing a supportive
limits substantially similar to the language contained in the petition to OSHA).
183. See Asleep at the Bedside? IOM Says Feds Should Issue Tough Work Hour Limits,
Hosp. EMPLOYEE HEALTH, Feb. 1, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 2453779 (noting one
commentator's belief that "working for more than sixteen consecutive hours without sleep is
hazardous for patients as well as the physicians themselves").
184. See Weinstein, supra note 180, at 1275 ("[A]s residents work fewer hours, their
activities might be shifted further toward service at the expense of education... [which] would
doom a program by alienating applicants and threatening accreditation.").
185. See Ferris M. Hall et al., The Case for More U.S. Medical Students, 343 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1573, 1574 (2000) (arguing that the surplus of medical resident positions over number of
students graduating from U.S. medical schools is a reflection of "reliance of teaching
hospitals... on residents as cheap labor to staff inpatient services").
186. See United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220
(S.D. Fla. 2005) ("At no point during any part of the residents' education at Mt. Sinai was any
resident permitted to, without the input and supervision of an attending physician: 1) perform
surgery; 2) prescribe a treatment plan; or 3) make a clinical or physiological determination."
(citations omitted)); United States v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 282 F. Supp. 2d
997, 1003 (D. Minn. 2003) ("Much of the training in the [hospital's] residency programs
involved clinical experiences, in which a resident learned by doing a medical task under the
direct and personal guidance and supervision of a full-time Mayo staff physician." (citations
omitted)).
187. See generally Hall et al., supra note 185.
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educational environment. The learning objectives of the program must not be
compromised by excessive reliance on residents to fulfill service
obligations."' 88 While not rejecting explicitly the notion that residents play an
important role in efficient and economical hospital administration, ACGME's
commentary on the work hour limitation indicates that hospitals are not to
exploit their residents for purposes of reducing administrative costs-
commitment to education comes first. ACGME's accreditation processes,
policies, and standards emphasize a focus on education over care-giving
services for GME programs.
189
ACGME has reaffirmed the purpose of accreditation as "provid[ing] for
training programs of good educational quality in each medical specialty."'
190
ACGME requires that each institution seeking accreditation establish a
curriculum for its GME programs with an emphasis on educational and
scholarly purpose.191 The GME must employ a sufficient number of faculty so
that the educational goals of the program's curriculum can be met
adequately.1 92 Additionally, any institution wishing to alter its program's duty
hour limitation must have an educational rationale. 193 If there is a "primary
188. ACGME-DuTy HOURS LANGUAGE 1 (2009), available at http://www.acgme.org
(emphasis added).
189. See generally REQUIREMENTS, supra note 182 (establishing standards for all GME
programs in the United States).
190. POLICIES & PROCEDURES, supra note 176, at 2 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 7. Part IV of the Common Program Requirements states, in relevant part:
Educational Program-A. The curriculum must contain the following educational
components: 1. Overall educational goals for the program, which the program must
distribute to residents and faculty annually; 2. Competency-based goals and
objectives for each assignment at each educational level, which the program must
distribute to residents and faculty annually, in either written or electronic form.
These should be reviewed by the resident at the start of each rotation....
B. Residents' Scholarly Activities-The curriculum must advance residents'
knowledge of the basic principles of research, including how research is conducted,
evaluated, explained to patients, and applied to patient care. Residents should
participate in scholarly activity.... The sponsoring institution and program should
allocate adequate educational resources to facilitate resident involvement in
scholarly activities.
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 182, at 7, 11.
192. See id. at 5 ("At each participating site, there must be a sufficient number of faculty
with documented qualifications to instruct and supervise all residents at that location."). The
program requirements go on to state: "The faculty must: devote sufficient time to the
educational program to fulfill their supervisory and teaching responsibilities; and to demonstrate
a strong interest in the education of residents, and administer and maintain an educational
environment conducive to educating residents in each of the ACGME competency areas." Id.
193. See POLICIES & PROCEDURES, supra note 176, at 110 ("The request must be based on a
sound educational rationale, which should be described in relation to the program's stated goals
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purpose" underlying the relationship between a GME program and its residents,
it seems clear that it is one based on education, as so much of ACGME's
requirements outline standards of educational excellence and considerations
based on the improvement of clinical learning.194 Were the focus on the
employment aspect of the GME's relationship with its residents, one could
argue that ACGME approves a dual purpose for GME programs (education and
labor). However, ACGME has been explicit on GMEs' responsibilities
towards maintaining a standard of high quality education, even in the face of
disrupting the status quo of teaching hospitals' work hours. 195
Of course, an argument could be made that the standards set forth by
ACGME are overly idealistic and that many GME programs often force their
residents-perhaps unofficially or even unwittingly-to exceed the eighty-hour
limit established by ACGME, adversely affecting the educational motives of
that GME program as well as its residents. 196 This argument is not without
merit, but determining exactly how many programs are not in conformity with
ACGME's accreditation standards (and the extent of their respective
deficiencies) may prove far too difficult for any practical use. It might also be
argued that GME programs do not necessarily share the goals and ideals of
their regulating institutions, specifically the ACGME. It is natural that teaching
hospitals might aspire to accomplish more than providing quality education to
resident doctors. 97  Such hospitals have duties to their patients, to the
communities in which they function, and arguably to the medical profession
itself. But this says nothing of the relationship between the hospital and the
residents, which, according to the federal courts, is the key focus of the student
exception analysis. 98 In fact, and as this Note argues, access to patient care is
an essential component of medical education, so even if the "primary function"
and objectives for the particular assignments, rotations, and level(s) of training for which the
increase is requested.").
194. See supra notes 176-94 and accompanying text (reviewing the language ofACGME's
various procedural requirements).
195. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing ACGME's mandate of
preserving educational focus in GME programs despite reduction in maximum duty work
hours).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1217,
1220-21 (S.D. Fla. 2005) ("Residents during the time period at issue were not limited to
working 80 hours per week, and some residents were spending more than 80 hours a week at the
hospital performing patient care." (citations omitted)).
197. Alternatively, these hospitals may be associated with organizations or corporations
which pursue a broader-perhaps corporate-interest.
198. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Kyle's rejection, in
Mayo II, of the "primary function test" contained in the regulations as amended through 2005).
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of a hospital sponsoring a GME program were something different than
resident education, residents indisputably would benefit directly from the
opportunities created by the hospital's patient care and community outreach
programs. 199
Given ACGME's demonstrated standards of commitment to the education
of medical residents (as opposed to their role as laborers in the medical market),
American GME programs wishing to obtain or retain accreditation status are
required to serve their residents primarily as educators.2°  If a GME's
relationship with its resident is educational, it follows that a resident's
relationship with her GME program is also educational because ACGME's
standards of education exist for the benefit of the residents' development as
doctors.
VI A Compromise
FICA's history is insufficient to establish Congress's intent to bar current-
day medical residents from the student exclusion, and though the IRS and SSA
are charged with promulgating regulations which implement the law of Social
Security,20 their efforts to include medical residents in FICA coverage dejure
go against a great weight of relevant authority, both legal and policy-oriented
alike.
Whether or not the statute and its implementing regulations are ambiguous
has been a hotly contested issue over the past few decades.20 2 And adequate
resolution of the dispute by the federal court system seems unlikely. The courts
which have reviewed the language of the student exception appear to have
decided the preferable, equitable outcome of their respective cases a priori, and
only then have they found some way to justify their conclusions. For example,
199. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (arguing that the education of residents
relies so heavily on kinesthetic learning techniques that patient care and graduate medical
education cannot be separated-they are necessarily interconnected).
200. Judicial notice has been taken on the interconnectivity between "education" and
"patient care." See, e.g., United States v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Mayo 1),
282 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1014-15 (D. Minn. 2003) ("Because the objective of residency programs
is ultimately to make physicians capable of caring for patients twenty-four hours a day and
seven days a week, it is impossible to separate 'education' from 'patient care."').
201. See GAO MEMO, supra note 171, at 2-3 ("Two federal agencies have key roles related
to Social Security and FICA. SSA maintains individual records on each worker's reported
wages subject to the FICA tax and distributes benefits based on these reported wages. IRS
collects FICA taxes and issues refunds.").
202. See supra Part II (presenting the conflicting views over the existence of ambiguity in
the language of § 3121 (b)(l) and its implementing regulations).
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in Mayo I, the court was too quick to find that the implementing regulations
were unambiguous and moved right into a case-by-case analysis of the GME
203programs. Common sense, however, requires one to hesitate and question
this approach, because the term "school, college, or university" is
unquestionably broad. As this Note has argued, this term has no inherent
meaning of its own-it requires boundaries and guidelines not found on the
face of the statute.2 4 In fact, the term SCU most easily finds its meaning
through an application of the facts of each case, and accordingly, any
standardized interpretation of the term seems to be futile. Ultimately, the case-
by-case approach first established in Apfel is appropriate, but the cost
associated with re-litigating this issue in perpetuity outweighs the need for a
facts-based standard of inquiry.
Even in Detroit Medical Center, the analysis is thin on substance. Most
notably, the court summarily rejects the notion that a GME program could ever
be a school, because, as it states, "it is generally accepted that GME programs
are not generally considered 'schools, colleges, or universities,' no matter what
organization places its name on the program., 20 5 The source of this generalized
conception of GME programs is unclear, but certainly, a "generalized
conception," if it is to have any teeth as a judicial conclusion, should be based
on accurate facts and circumstances. The Detroit Medical Center court
attempted to bypass the Apfel case-by-case approach so that it might rely upon
particular legislative history.20 6 However, in holding that GME programs were
not "educational," it was necessarily relying on some outdated analysis of the
facts and circumstances of such programs.20 7 Of course, this Note has
attempted to show that the presumption should be in favor of GME programs'
qualification under the student exemption because these programs are
educational in nature. But even assuming this to be wrong, a contrasting
presumption should not avoid implicitly conducting its own case-by-case
analysis. Simply put, it is absolutely necessary to view the student exception
203. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (highlighting Judge Kyle's failure to
engage in a true Chevron analysis).
204. See supra Part II.A.3.a (discussing the ambiguity of the term "school, college, or
university").
205. United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 05-71722, 2006 WL 3497312, at *10 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 1, 2006).
206. See supra notes 110-15 (discussing the Detroit Medical Center court's finding of
ambiguity in order to utilize the section's legislative history as an interpretive tool).
207. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Detroit Medical
Center court's hasty conclusion that it was generally accepted that GME programs were not
educational).
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through the lens of the institution seeking the exclusion, and unavoidably, this
requires a case-by-case analysis.
A. Framework of Proposal
The nature of GME programs and the accreditation process, coupled with
the focus of today's medical education (in contrast with the focus in 1939),
strongly suggests that GME be permitted to operate outside the realm of FICA
taxation. Such a rule would bring some measure of clarity to FICA taxation in
general and would reduce overall costs to GME programs as they will have
confidence in their tax exempt status and will be spared significant litigation
expenses relating to FICA refund suits. Ultimately, this would lead to more
efficient and effective GME programs in the United States. Logically, the
overall goal of creating better doctors relies on the educational institution's
ability to provide the best facilities, instruction, and exposure to the practice of
medicine as possible for its students. Fewer resources wasted on litigating the
student exemption issue would enable GME program administrators to pursue
superior educational opportunities. If the IRS is permitted repeatedly to haul
teaching hospitals and other similar institutions into court for infinite bites at
the apple, the whole of the medical education institution would be placed in
jeopardy.
It is important to recognize once again the total absence of review of
ACGME's GME accreditation standards in the various federal court cases
deciding the applicability of the student exception to medical residents. This
omission is particularly alarming with respect to the majority approach. An
effective case-by-case analysis must require a review of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and it seems that ACGME's accreditation standards would be
paramount to such an analysis. Of course, those courts employing the majority
approach consistently have found that medical residents' stipends are properly
excludable under § 3121 (b)(10), so any measurable effect that a discussion of
the ACGME standards might have would be cumulative.
The IRS has lost the fight with the GME community. Courts finding in
favor of the applicability of the student exception to medical residents have
rejected nearly every one of the IRS's attempts to disqualify the residents,
usually on the ground that the amended regulation offends a fair and reasonable
reading of § 3121(b)(1 0).208 The courts which have found in favor of the
208. See, e.g., supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the Mayo I court's view
that residents were exempt under a plain reading of the statute).
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government's position resort to legislative history, which is sparse, outdated,
and devoid of any real substance. °9
It is time for Congress to step in and resolve the dispute over its own intent
regarding the student exception under § 3121 (b)(1 0). All other conceivable
avenues of resolution have failed: the courts have bifurcated on the appropriate
analytical approach; the IRS has been wholly unsuccessful in accomplishing
through regulation amendments what it believes is the "clear intent" of
Congress; and the medical community remains vulnerable due to insecurity
about which path the next federal court will take. In light of the foregoing
analysis, this "intent" should manifest in presumptive FICA exemption for
medical residents and their sponsoring institutions.
209. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' minority
stance that involves utilizing legislative history in order to find the exemption inapplicable to
medical residents as a matter of law); see also supra note 175 and accompanying text
(describing the student exception's minimal legislative history).
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